Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.
https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/
exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers.
What? Which dumbass wrote this? A 10yo skiddie can do this with a simple enforced proxy on an open WiFi AP.
I could literally grab a travel router, use the already installed OpenWrt on it, and deploy a sniffer that proxies all traffic, and for any traffic using the specific keys that leaked… unpack and repack those requests and responses on the fly.
I love how they’re trying to downplay this.
A trusted CA with a private key that’s literally just the number 4. This is the funniest security incident of all time.
The certificate authority and their auditor will need to answer questions from browsers.
They both should have detected and reported this.
